

Supplemental Appendix For
**Economic Shocks, Coordination, and Repression in the Developing
World**

Contents

Summary Statistics	2
Summary Tables	2
Global Urbanization Maps	4
Robustness Models	5
References	11

Summary Statistics

Summary Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables, 1993-2007 (Urban Sample)

	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cell level indicators					
<i>Deaths by Government_t</i> ¹	0	0.005	0.125	0	11.406
<i>Attacks by Government_t</i> ¹	0	0.003	0.068	0	3.871
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t</i>	0.182	0.360	0.500	0	15.196
<i>Population_t</i> ¹	11.141	10.758	2.489	0	16.691
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0	0.052	0.222	0	1
<i>Ethnic exclusion_t</i>	0	0.386	0.642	0	6
<i>Capital Distance</i> ¹	6.548	6.453	1.136	1.548	8.965
<i>Border Distance</i> ¹	5.421	5.231	1.325	0.013	8.317
<i>Mountains</i>	0	0.206	0.331	0	1
<i>Deaths by Government_{t-1}</i> ¹	0	0.005	0.128	0	11.406
<i>Attacks by Government_{t-1}</i> ¹	0	0.004	0.069	0	3.871
<i>Drought_t</i>	0	0.047	0.054	0	0.667
<i>Urbanized Area</i>	0.198	0.981	2.485	0.002	51.549
<i>Cell Area</i> ¹	7.722	7.537	0.700	0.029	8.039
<i>Temperature_t</i>	12.268	13.210	8.641	-21.240	37.158
<i>Nighttime Light_t</i>	0.069	0.112	0.116	0.014	1
Country level indicators					
<i>Price Shock_t</i>	0	0.232	0.422	0	1
<i>Polity2_t</i>	9	4.530	6.919	-10	10
<i>New State_t</i>	0	0.001	0.037	0	1
<i>Country Area</i> ¹	7.708	7.514	0.703	0.029	8.037
<i>Oil Production_t</i>	18.106	15.829	5.654	0	19.980
<i>Gas Production_t</i>	5.304	5.035	2.759	0	8.436
<i>Price Shock (1.5 SD)_t</i>	0	0.077	0.266	0	1
<i>Price Shock (all, 15th%)_t</i>	0	0.140	0.347	0	1
<i>Price Shock (all, 25th%)_t</i>	0	0.248	0.432	0	1
<i>GDP Shock_t</i>	0	0.084	0.277	0	1

¹ Natural log.

Table A2: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables, 1993-2007 (Full Sample)

	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cell level indicators					
<i>Deaths by Government</i> _t ¹	0	0.002	0.073	0	11.406
<i>Attacks by Government</i> _t ¹	0	0.001	0.037	0	3.871
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure</i> _t	0	0.111	0.306	0	18.513
<i>Population</i> _t ¹	8.304	7.804	3.703	0	16.691
<i>Civil War</i> _t	0	0.063	0.245	0	1
<i>Ethnic exclusion</i> _t	0	0.482	0.602	0	6
<i>Capital Distance</i> ¹	7.073	6.995	1.111	1.020	8.982
<i>Border Distance</i> ¹	5.770	5.628	1.442	0.003	8.340
<i>Mountains</i>	0	0.224	0.352	0	1
Country level indicators					
<i>Price Shock</i> _t	0	0.206	0.405	0	1
<i>Polity2</i> _t	6	4.454	6.140	-10	10
<i>New State</i> _t	0	0.0003	0.018	0	1
<i>Country Area</i> ¹	7.659	7.380	0.966	2.560 e-06	8.037

¹ Natural log.

Table A3: List of Countries Analyzed

Bahamas	Cuba	Haiti	Dominican Republic
Jamaica	Trinidad & Tobago	Barbados	Mexico
Belize	Guatemala	Honduras	El Salvador
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Panama	Colombia
Venezuela	Guyana	Suriname	Ecuador
Peru	Brazil	Bolivia	Paraguay
Chile	Argentina	Uruguay	Azerbaijan
Guinea-Bissau	Gambia	Mali	Senegal
Benin	Mauritania	Niger	Côte d'Ivoire
Guinea	Burkina Faso	Liberia	Sierra Leone
Ghana	Togo	Cameroon	Nigeria
Gabon	Central African Republic	Chad	Congo – Brazzaville
Congo – Kinshasa	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania
Burundi	Rwanda	Somalia	Djibouti
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Angola	Mozambique
Zambia	Zimbabwe	Malawi	South Africa
Namibia	Lesotho	Botswana	Swaziland
Madagascar	Morocco	Algeria	Tunisia
Libya	Sudan	Iran	Turkey
Iraq	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan
Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar
United Arab Emirates	Oman	Afghanistan	Turkmenistan
Kyrgyzstan	Kazakhstan	China	Mongolia
South Korea	Japan	India	Pakistan
Bangladesh	Myanmar (Burma)	Sri Lanka	Nepal
Thailand	Cambodia	Laos	Vietnam
Malaysia	Singapore	Philippines	Indonesia
Papua New Guinea			

Global Urbanization Maps

Figure A1: Urbanization Levels (2009) by 0.5° Grid Cell





Figure A2: Urbanization Levels (2009) by 0.5° Grid Cell, Countries Analyzed



Robustness Models

To evaluate the sensitivity of our findings to alternative confounders, sampling, and modeling choices, we estimate a large number of robustness model corresponding to the full models from the main paper for each dependent variables, *Deaths by Government_t* and *Attacks by Government_t* in Tables A4–A7 below. As mentioned in the article, each model corresponds to the full specification with fixed effects by country for each DV, as to further ensure robustness.

In Tables A4 and A6, we begin by estimating a set of models that account for country-level heterogeneities by clustering standard errors by country instead of by grid cell. The next column in both respective tables then accounts for potential temporal dependencies in regime violence by reestimating our full model with the addition of one-year lag of each respective dependent variable. The third set of robustness models then account for a number of potential confounders that might explain the results, including the extent of cell area that is urbanized (instead of urban infrastructure concentrations, specifically), drought- or high-temperature-induced shortages and migrations to urban areas, proximity of each urban grid cell to the equator, and oil and gas production (to account for the impact of natural resources), in addition to the one-year lag of each dependent variable. Having accounted for a large number of potential confounders, we next turn to ensure that our results are specific to variations in infrastructure concentrations and economic shocks occurring solely *within* urban grid cells, rather than caused by across-grid cell variations. To this end, the fourth set of model re-estimates the full specifications for both dependent variables using fixed effects by year and by *grid cell* to account for all observed and unobserved variations across grid cells that are constant over time, a standard econometric practice to identify causal effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Next, recall that we made an empirical decision to focus only areas with some level of urbanization in our analysis because such regions most directly correspond to our theoretical-formal model. To ensure that our findings are not driven by this decision, we relax this empirical assumption to analyze *all PRIO-Grid cells* within our states interest– urban and rural – rather than only urban ones in the fifth column. Sixth, recall that our sample includes three developed state – Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Accordingly, the next column in each respective table re-estimates the full models where all grid cell years in these countries are omitted from analysis. The last column in each table re-estimates the full models for each DV with the inclusion of the quadratic term of our *Polity2_t* variable – *Polity2_t²* –to account for the possibility that our results are driven by “middle-of-the-road” democracies, or “anocracies,” which are at a higher risk of conflict and mass killing (Vreeland, 2008; Ulfelder, 2012).

Turning to Tables A5 and A7, we first re-estimate our models on a sample from which all

nondemocratic states – that is states with a $Polity2_t$ score of 6 or below – were removed. The resulting sample is a democracies-only subsample, which helps to further illustrate that our results are not driven by the inclusion of authoritarian states, which research often associates with a higher probability of repression (Davenport, 2007; DeMeritt, 2016). Additionally, we also show that the result are not driven by the inclusion of democracies in the sample in the second column, by removing all states with a $Polity2_t$ score of 7 or above from analysis. The final sets of models are designed to illustrate that our results are not driven by the coding decisions behind our main explanatory variables of interest, $Price Shock_t$ and $Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t$. To this end, the third column in each table relies on a threshold of 1.5 standard deviations below the mean of Bazzi and Blattman’s (2014) exogenous price variable, again, *for a given country* (as done with the original $Price Shock_t$ variable), to dichotomize our measure of price shocks. The fourth column then relaxes our reliance on country-specific variations by dichotomizing exogenous price shocks as the lower 15th percentile of *all price shock levels globally* – that is, a threshold on Bazzi and Blattman’s 2014 indicator of -0.184 or less – to bifurcate our shock indicator. We then extend this threshold to the bottom 25th percentile of the sample – that is, a threshold on Bazzi and Blattman’s 2014 indicator of less than -0.184 – to bifurcate our shock indicator in the ensuing column. The sixth column then relies on GDP per capita (in 2010 U.S dollars) to bifurcate economic shock as any year in which GDP per capita levels within a given country decreased compared with the previous year’s values, for all grid cells within this country. The final column in each table relaxes the assumptions underlying our $Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t$ by using an indicator of nighttime light emissions in a given annual urban cell unnormalized by population instead. Crucially, our findings hold across *every model* in Tables A4–A7 (to at least the $p < 0.1$ levels).

Table A4: Deaths by Government, Robustness Models I

	CSEs	Lag DV	Controls	GFEs	All Cells	Dev. states	Anocracies
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t</i>	0.023*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)
<i>Price Shock_t</i>	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t × Price Shock_t</i>	0.024*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)
<i>Population_t¹</i>	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005 (0.009)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.067*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.003)	0.059*** (0.003)	0.085*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)
<i>Ethnic exclusion_t</i>	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.003*** (0.0003)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
<i>Capital Distance¹</i>	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
<i>Border Distance¹</i>	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.198** (0.086)	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
<i>Mountains</i>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)		0.004*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
<i>Polity2_t</i>	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.00001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0004)
<i>Polity2_t²</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0001* (0.0001)
<i>New State_t</i>	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.0003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.027)
<i>Country Area¹</i>	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.014 (0.010)		-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
<i>DV_{t-1}</i>		0.158*** (0.004)	0.157*** (0.004)	-	-	-	-
<i>Drought_t</i>	-	-	-0.022 (0.013)	-	-	-	-
<i>Temperature_t</i>	-	-	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-	-	-	-
<i>Urbanized Area</i>	-	-	0.0003 (0.0004)	-	-	-	-
<i>Cell Area¹</i>	-	-	0.012 (0.010)	-	-	-	-
<i>Oil Production_t</i>	-	-	-0.001 (0.001)	-	-	-	-
<i>Gas Production_t</i>	-	-	-0.0003 (0.002)	-	-	-	-
<i>Constant</i>	0.004 (0.014)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.037)	-	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.037 (0.025)
Observations	74,240	74,240	72,593	74,240	381,829	74,240	74,240
R ²	0.081	0.105	0.106	0.201	0.037	0.081	0.081
Adjusted R ²	0.080	0.104	0.104	0.142	0.036	0.080	0.080

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses apart from the CSEs (clustered by country) and GFEs (no clustered SEs) models. Fixed effects by country and year are included in each model, although none is reported here.

¹ Natural log

Table A5: Deaths by Government, Robustness Models II

	Democracies	Authoritarian	1.5 SD shock	All, 10th%	All, 25th%	GDP Shock	NTL
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t</i>	0.046*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.104*** (0.012)
<i>Price Shock_t</i>	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.009** (0.004)
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t × Price Shock_t</i>	0.060*** (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.064*** (0.018)
<i>Population_t</i> ¹	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.001)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.004 (0.003)	0.119*** (0.005)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.069*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)
<i>Ethnic exclusion_t</i>	0.005** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
<i>Capital Distance</i> ¹	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
<i>Border Distance</i> ¹	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0004)	-0.002** (0.001)
<i>Mountains</i>	0.017*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
<i>Polity2_t</i>	-0.004 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0004)
<i>New State_t</i>	-	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.027)	-	-0.004 (0.027)
<i>Country Area</i> ¹	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0004 (0.034)	-0.052 (0.033)	-0.046* (0.025)	-0.045* (0.025)	-0.045* (0.025)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.039 (0.025)
Observations	17,308	56,932	74,240	74,240	74,240	98,841	74,240
R ²	0.093	0.086	0.081	0.081	0.081	0.066	0.081
Adjusted R ²	0.090	0.084	0.080	0.080	0.079	0.065	0.080

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects by country and year are included in each model, although none is reported here. Note that the variable *New State_t* is constant in some subsamples reported above, and is omitted in these models.

¹ Natural log

Table A6: Attacks by Government, Robustness Models I

	CSEs	Lag DV	Controls	GFEs	All Cells	Dev. states	Anocracies
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t</i>	0.024*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.005)	0.019*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)
<i>Price Shock_t</i>	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.00001 (0.0004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t × Price Shock_t</i>	0.017*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
<i>Population_t¹</i>	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.027*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.0003)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.002)
<i>Ethnic exclusion_t</i>	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.002*** (0.0002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Capital Distance¹</i>	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.001* (0.0005)	-0.001* (0.0005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)
<i>Border Distance¹</i>	-0.002*** (0.0004)	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.209*** (0.039)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
<i>Mountains</i>	0.009*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)		0.003*** (0.0003)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)
<i>Polity2_t</i>	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0003** (0.0002)	0.0003* (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0002*** (0.00004)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)
<i>Polity2_t²</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.0001*** (0.00004)
<i>New State_t</i>	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)
<i>Country Area¹</i>	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.005)		-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
<i>DV_{t-1}</i>		0.416*** (0.003)	0.416*** (0.003)	-	-	-	-
<i>Drought_t</i>	-	-	-0.013** (0.006)	-	-	-	-
<i>Temperature_t</i>	-	-	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-	-	-	-
<i>Urbanized Area</i>	-	-	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-	-	-	-
<i>Cell Area¹</i>	-	-	0.013*** (0.005)	-	-	-	-
<i>Oil Production_t</i>	-	-	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-	-	-	-
<i>Gas Production_t</i>	-	-	-0.002 (0.001)	-	-	-	-
<i>Constant</i>	0.007 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.017)	-	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.030** (0.013)
Observations	74,240	74,240	72,593	74,240	381,829	74,240	74,240
R ²	0.106	0.269	0.271	0.375	0.038	0.106	0.106
Adjusted R ²	0.105	0.268	0.270	0.330	0.038	0.105	0.105

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses apart from the CSEs (clustered by country) and GFEs (no clustered SEs) models. Fixed effects by country and year are included in each model, although none is reported here.

¹ Natural log

Table A7: Attacks by Government, Robustness Models II

	Democracies	Authoritarian	1.5 SD shock	All, 10th%	All, 25th%	GDP Shock	NTL
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t</i>	0.048*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.106*** (0.006)
<i>Price Shock_t</i>	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
<i>Concentrated Urban Infrastructure_t × Price Shock_t</i>	0.048*** (0.006)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.041*** (0.009)
<i>Population_t</i> ¹	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0002)	0.002*** (0.0003)
<i>Civil War_t</i>	0.006* (0.003)	0.045*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.001)	0.027*** (0.002)
<i>Ethnic exclusion_t</i>	0.004* (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Capital Distance</i> ¹	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001** (0.001)
<i>Border Distance</i> ¹	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
<i>Mountains</i>	0.020*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)
<i>Polity2_t</i>	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)
<i>New State_t</i>	-	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.014)	-	-0.005 (0.014)
<i>Country Area</i> ¹	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.0004)	-0.003*** (0.001)
<i>Constant</i>	0.026 (0.034)	-0.029** (0.015)	-0.038*** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.038*** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.013)
Observations	17,308	56,932	74,240	74,240	74,240	98,841	74,240
R ²	0.136	0.105	0.106	0.107	0.106	0.104	0.107
Adjusted R ²	0.133	0.103	0.105	0.106	0.105	0.103	0.105

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects by country and year are included in each model, although none is reported here. Note that the variable *New State_t* is constant in some subsamples reported above, and is omitted in these models.

¹ Natural log

References

- Angrist, J. D. and J. S. Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bazzi, Samuel and Christopher Blattman. 2014. "Economic shocks and conflict: Evidence from commodity prices." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6(4):1–38.
- Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State repression and political order." *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 10:1–23.
- DeMeritt, Jacqueline HR. 2016. The Strategic Use of State Repression and Political Violence. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press New York.
- Ulfelder, Jay. 2012. "Forecasting onsets of mass killing."
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy." *Journal of conflict Resolution* 52(3):401–425.