Terrorism and Political Violence

Military Structure, Civil Disobedience, and Military Violence

Ore Koren [a]

[a] Department of Political Science , University of Minnesota , Minneapolis , Minnesota , USA
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ORE KOREN

Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

In this article, I argue that factors inherent to the structure of a military organization and their relationship with the political leadership play a role in the organization's tendency to perpetrate violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns. To examine this hypothesis, I conducted a three-phased statistical analysis on a database containing 97 campaigns that took place between 1972 and 2012. In the first phase, I examined the relationship between military centric factors and violent crackdowns. In the second phase, I examined the relationship between military centric factors and mass killing. In the third stage, I examined the relationship between two specific types of discrimination in the military and mass killing. I found strong evidence supporting the hypothesis mentioned above. High-risk militaries that served a militarized regime, contained loosely regulated or indoctrinated paramilitaries, and discriminated against the protesting group, were much more likely to perpetrate violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns than low-risk militaries. The conclusions of this study suggest that further examination of the military's role in perpetrating violence against civilians during protests and conflict may provide some novel findings.

Keywords civil disobedience, discrimination, mass killing, military politicization, military violence, paramilitaries

Does the structure and type of a military organization tell us anything about the likelihood of violence against civilians during campaigns of civil disobedience? In this article, I argue that this is the case, and examine several factors that can help us understand which military organizations are more prone to use violence.[1] Focusing on military and paramilitary organizations is important for several reasons. First, in weaker states with less centralized governments, officials are unable (or unwilling) to control the behavior of units in the field. This gap of responsibility provides the units deployed to a certain region with considerable autonomy to use any means they see fit. Second, if a military organization is not logistically supported, it may be more likely to prey on the local population, including the people whom it was supposed to defend (e.g., the Sierra Leone Army during the Civil War in Sierra Leone). Third, if the military views the protesting group as a foreign element based on ethnic, religious, or other

grounds, it may be more likely to use violence against this group or obey orders to use violence against it (e.g., the Israeli Defense Force in the First Intifada or the Nigerian military during the Ogoni Campaign). Fourth, even if the military organization is well controlled and well supported, it may employ paramilitary forces to handle the more Sisyphean aspect of its duties. These groups are usually less disciplined or more politically indoctrinated in comparison to the regular military force (e.g., the Iranian *Basaij* and the Serbian Arkan's Tigers), and hence more likely to use violence against civilians.

Not all civil disobedience campaigns result in many civilian deaths, and few experience mass killing of civilians. Yet, of the 97 cases I examined, 35 presented violent crackdown and 15 presented mass killing. Superficially, distinguishing between these countries that crack down violently or perpetrate mass killing and those that do not is complicated. In addition, certain countries may crack down violently during certain campaigns, while not doing so in others (e.g., Argentina and Madagascar).

Surprisingly, however, very little up-to-date research has been produced concerning the role of the military in internal conflict.[2] The majority of scholarship on violence against civilians focuses on the political leadership and treats the military as a coherent whole that faithfully serves the political leadership. I refer to this scholarship as the "state centric approach." The state centric approach provides a seemingly attractive explanation for violence against civilians, but I argue it is incomplete. One way of complementing the state centric approach is by examining another set of theories that focus on the military, which I refer to as the "military centric approach." From the military centric approach I derived two testable hypotheses. The first hypothesizes that a certain type of paramilitary group, which is loosely regulated by the state, is more likely to perpetrate violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns. The second hypothesizes that violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns may be associated with militarized regimes.

The military centric approach goes further than the state centric approach in explaining the relationship between the military and violence against civilians, but I argue that there is a place for more focus on the military. In other words, I believe that the military centric approach is not military centric enough. This article discusses the effects of certain factors related to the structure of the military on the occurrence and level of violence against civilians during primarily nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns that presented an existential threat to the regime. I do not examine the various motivations of the regime to use violence against civilians, because I assume that an existential threat could push even a peaceful democracy into using the strongest security mechanisms available: the state's military and paramilitary forces (e.g., Canada's October 1970 Crisis). Nor do I examine campaigns that presented any form of violent resistance, even if these campaigns began as nonviolent protests and deteriorated into civil wars following a violent repression (e.g., the recent events in Syria and Libya). I avoided analyzing civil wars because in such campaigns the level of threat posed to the military is much higher and hence it is more likely to react violently and indiscriminately.

Repressing a large civil disobedience movement can be harder than first expected, not the least because distinguishing between a civilian who actively participates in a campaign, a civilian who is a passive supporter, and a civilian who does not support the campaign is usually complicated. Hence, the military force ordered to contain a large-scale protest may encounter problems for which it is unprepared, especially if its raison d'être is interstate war. Placed between the hammer of the protesters and the anvil of the political leadership, the behavior of the military can vary from defecting

to the side of the protesters in certain cases to perpetrating mass killings in others.[3] Although this behavior is dictated by various factors, I believe that the structure of a military organization may play a greater role than what is believed, regardless of the nature of the regime or its aims.

The alert reader may have noticed that I did not analyze local police forces in this study, only police organizations that fit the definition of a paramilitary force. True, examining local police forces could have supplemented my findings, but there are several reasons why these forces are absent from my analysis. First, because most police forces are locally controlled, coding them would have necessitated coding every town and borough in each of my observations, a task that I must admit was beyond my abilities. Second, as I mentioned above, the campaigns analyzed in this study posed an existential threat to the regime (meaning they had a maximalist aim as defined later in this article), which made the latter more likely to use the military or state controlled paramilitaries. Third, in most cases, casualties attributed to police violence were actually caused by state police organizations, many of which I coded as "paramilitaries." The reader should note that my analysis did include special police forces known as "death squads," because the military or the government usually controlled these units, and that I examined paramilitaries (including state police forces) only as subsidiaries of the military apparatus, and not as independent organizations.

The remainder of this article is divided into six sections. In the first section, I define the terms "violent crackdown" and "mass killing." In the second section, I discuss hypotheses derived from the military centric approach. The third section presents my theoretical argument regarding the causal relationship between military structure and military violence. In the fourth section, I discuss the measurement of my variables and describe my research design for testing hypotheses. In the fifth section, I describe the results of my statistical analysis. In the concluding section, I discuss some of the implications of these findings and new directions of research.

Violent Crackdown and Mass Killing

In this article, I seek to highlight the role of the military and its paramilitary subsidiaries as the main perpetrators of large-scale violence against civilians. To do so, I decided to code two different levels of violence: violent crackdown and mass killing. These measurements account for civilian casualties caused by targeted violence rather than collateral deaths. Because I am interested in violence perpetrated by official state organizations, I limited my analysis of killings to those carried out by national governments. I decided to focus on civil disobedience campaigns that began after 1972, for several reasons. First, media records became more accessible and casualty measurements more precise after the mid-1970s. Second, civil disobedience campaigns seem to have become more common after the 1960s. Last, choosing 1972 as my cutoff year still allowed me to examine a period of four decades that encompassed the Cold War, the 1990s, and the Arab Spring.

Violent crackdown is defined as the intentional killing of at least 50 protesters by government forces during a civil disobedience campaign. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, whose standards I used for deriving my campaign list, define a campaign as "a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective."[4] A campaign can last "anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts."[5] So, for example, both the 10-year long defiance campaign in South Africa and the few months long East German Revolution were

analyzed as discrete observations. Although this may seem like a wide variation, the reader should bear in mind that the mean campaign length in my dataset was 1.526 years and that the median was one year.[6] I elaborate more about how a campaign was defined in the third section of this article. Victims may be members of any group, considering only that they have participated in organized civil resistance against the regime.

There are many different ways to code regime violence, depending on the threshold one wishes to use. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan define regime violence as a "[d]ichotomous variable identifying whether the regime used violence to crack down on campaign," which is collected from "[v]arious encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts."[7] For the purpose of my analysis, I preferred to use a numeric rather than a qualitative cutoff point. Adopting this specific numerical criterion may be arbitrary to some extent, but this relatively high threshold allowed me to separate incidents of accidental deaths caused by intense police brutality from direct deaths caused by intentional regime violence with a greater degree of confidence.[8]

The definition of who is a "protester" is also important. A protester is a person who actively participates in a civil disobedience campaign, be it through protesting, striking (including hunger strikes), or using other means of resistance that are primarily nonviolent.[9] A protester is *not* a rebel, a terrorist, a guerrilla, a freedom fighter, or any other person who uses violent means to achieve a certain aim. Note that a protester may support such persons without being considered an active rebel. It is precisely this association that can cause a military organization wary of suffering casualties to use excessive violence during civil disobedience campaigns.

Mass killing is defined as the intentional killing of a large number of noncombatants during a civil disobedience campaign. I derived the numerical definition and observations of mass killing incidents from a dataset constructed by Jay Ulfeder and Benjamin Valentino, who define mass killing as "any event in which *the actions of state agents result in the intentional death of at least 1,000 noncombatants from a discrete group in a period of sustained violence*."[10] Ulfeder and Valentino add another condition that helps differentiating violent crackdowns from mass killings by defining that "[i]f fewer than 100 total fatalities are recorded annually for any three consecutive years during the event, the event was considered to have ended during the first year within that three-year period in which fatalities dropped below 100 per year (even if killing continues at levels in later years)."[11] A noncombatant is defined "as any unarmed person who is not a current member of a formal or irregular military organization and does not apparently post an immediate threat to the life, physical safety, or property of other people."[12]

Hypotheses on Military Violence Against Civilians Derived From the State Centric and Military Centric Literature

Extant literature offers several potential explanations as to why some civil disobedience campaigns are violently repressed while others are not. There are, however, two significant distinctions between the causal explanation for military violence against civilians hypothesized at the beginning of this article and the standard conceptualization in existing literature. First, the state centric approach treats the entire security apparatus as a coherent whole.[13] In doing so, scholars of internal conflict neglect the discrepancy between the orders given by the political leadership and their implementation in the

field. The extent of this discrepancy depends on the strength, discipline, and loyalty of the armed organization, and how likely it is to follow orders or respect certain values. States with a weak or unstable political leadership, where the military is usually one of the most powerful institutions, are especially likely to be affected by this phenomenon.

Second, most scholars of violence against civilians usually focus on civil wars, where noncombatants are more likely to be grouped together with armed rebels. This is true for both state centric and military centric approaches. Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn have attempted to bridge the gap between the study of civil war and nonviolent resistance, arguing that "civil war models that do not control for levels of latent (i.e. nonviolent) conflict will be mis-specified and might suffer from omitted variable bias."[14] The purpose of this article, however, is not to examine the reasons of a given regime to target civilians, but rather to examine the role of military and paramilitary organizations in this violence. For this reason, I will focus primarily on hypotheses derived from the military centric literature.

The military centric literature can be broadly divided into two parts. The first type of scholarship focuses primarily on the role of paramilitaries and state sponsored militias in violence against civilians.[15] This scholarship suggests at least two factors that account for civilian casualties in war. First, many scholars have argued that paramilitary groups and state sponsored militias are an important cause of abuses against civilians. These organizations serve as an alternative military force, which is more likely to obey the government's orders.[16] This is especially true in countries where the military is the strongest elite or is very likely to perform a coup d'état. In such a case, as Andrew Dowdle argues, "[a] more effective strategy may be to build paramilitary organizations' loyalty to the government and make them strong enough to oppose any attempts to overthrow the regime."[17]

Second, this scholarship suggests that paramilitary organizations are at greater risk of recruiting individuals that are more likely to perpetrate violence against noncombatants. This happens because this organization adheres to a certain political ideology, or because its conscription mechanisms are more skewed than those of the regular military, which usually follows more balanced criteria (physical fitness, representations of minorities, aspirations for a long term career, etc.).[18] In a well-functioning society, such individuals are checked by norms of behavior and law enforcement agencies or channel their negative traits into other areas such as ultranationalist political demonstrations, petty crimes, or soccer hooliganism. However, during civil conflict the fabric of a well-functioning society is weakened and these individuals can find more sinister ways to channel these traits, which can win them both national appreciation and materialistic gains.

The scholarship that focuses on paramilitary organizations can be augmented in two main areas. First, military centric theories offer qualitative explanations for particular cases, but rarely test violence against civilians on a wide selection and number of cases.[19] Second, as I mentioned earlier, the attention given to paramilitary organizations focuses mainly on civil war. More violent and frequently involving a guerilla force operating within a civilian population, civil wars are more likely to induce violent reaction towards civilians, especially by a military force attempting to locate elusive guerillas. Civil disobedience campaigns, in contrast, present a lower risk for the forces in the field (even if they pose a great threat to the regime). Hence, the theories about paramilitary organizations mentioned above may be less relevant for primarily nonviolent campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan comment on this point

by arguing that, "whereas governments easily justify violent counterattacks against armed insurgents, regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire against the regime."[20] Despite these two distinctions, however, the argument stands that paramilitary organizations may be more likely to induce violence against civilians. This implies the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 1 (H1):* Military violence is more likely when the security apparatus of the state includes certain types of politically motivated paramilitary forces or similar organizations that are not officially regulated by the government.

The second type of military centric scholarship focuses primarily on military politicization, i.e., the involvement of the military in all levels of the government.[21] Several authors have suggested that militarized regimes are more likely to use repression against mass opposition.[22] Other scholars have suggested that a certain type of military organization, called "the praetorian army," is more likely to stage a military coup and may also be more likely to use repression. In fragmented states, where political institutions are weak and no substantive middle class exists, the praetorian military offers a seemingly more stable option. Praetorian militaries view themselves as more professional and meritocratic than any civilian alternative (although this view is usually misguided), and conceive their involvement in the civilian government as an extension of their mandate to defend the state. As a result, these militaries may be more likely to use violence during civil disobedience campaigns that pose an existential threat to the state.[23]

One well-known scholar who tackled this question was Samuel Huntington. Operating under the assumption that the civilian sphere and the military sphere are inherently different, Huntington recognized numerous structures and factors that regulate civil-military relations. These factors become especially important when the issue of authority over the state comes into play:

> The level of authority of the officer corps is maximized if it is placed at the peak of the hierarchy and the other institutions of the government are subordinate to it: if, in other words, it or its leaders exercise military sovereignty. A level of somewhat less authority exists if the military do not possess authority over other institutions, and no other institutions possess authority over them. … This situation is military independence. Thirdly, the officer corps may be subordinate to only one other institution possessing effective final authority. In other words, the officer corps has direct access to the sovereign. After this, the officer corps might gradually be further subordinated in the governmental structure. … Since this one level is normally in the form of a civilian departmental minister, this level of military authority may be called ministerial control.[24]

Although Huntington's study is somewhat outdated, his argument regarding authority remains relevant, because it implies that the higher the level of military authority in a given state, the more likely its military is to use violence against protesters during civil disobedience campaigns. This could happen because the same military force that is more likely to stage a coup is also the one more likely to use repression, or

because military regimes are simply less tolerant than any other form of government to opposition. Nevertheless, this suggests a second hypothesis about the relationship between military structure and military violence:

> *H2:* Military violence is more likely in states where the military has a higher level of authority over other state institutions, and the highest in states where the military holds supreme authority.

Military Structure and Military Violence

The hypotheses derived above suggest that the military organizations of a state play a role in violence, but these theories focus on auxiliary forces or the participation of the military in the political sphere. I argue that some militaries may be more prone to use violence against protesters simply because their structure is more likely to accommodate it. This tendency is influenced by the existence and extent of certain factors that interweave the civil and military spheres, or the lack thereof.

For the purpose of my analysis, a civil disobedience campaign is an act of nonviolent resistance that involves at least 1000 protesters and can last anywhere from days to years.[25] I derived the list of campaigns from the database created by Chenoweth and Stephan, who define nonviolent resistance as "a civilian based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence."[26] In order to determine if a conflict was primarily nonviolent, "[t]he list of nonviolent campaigns was initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict…we corroborated these data using multiple sources.…Finally, the cases were circulated among experts in nonviolent conflict who were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized major nonviolent conflict."[27]

Perhaps most important for our purposes is the fact that in order to be included in the dataset, a civil disobedience campaign must have posed an existential threat to the regime, defined by Chenoweth and Stephan as "a maximalist aim." A regime (even a democracy) that faces an existential threat to itself or its raison d'être is more likely to react violently, and hence it is more probable that the variation in civilian casualties is the result of factors related to implementation. Chenoweth and Stephan define "a maximalist aim" as seeking "regime change, secession, or self-determination," as opposed to "limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights)."[28] This means that most protests in democracies are absent from this database, because protests in democracies usually follow "limited" aims as defined above.

The main shortcoming of the Chenoweth-Stephan database for the purposes of this article is that it does not include civil disobedience campaigns that commenced after 2006. Because I examined civil disobedience campaigns between 1972 and 2012, I applied the Chenoweth-Stephan standards to any case that occurred after 2006. I did not have the benefit of circulating my list among sixteen experts on nonviolent resistance, so whenever I encountered ambiguity, I preferred to err on the safe side and omit the observation. As a result, I believe that, even if some were omitted, the cases included in my dataset were very likely to appear in the original Chenoweth-Stephan database.

As I mentioned, civil disobedience campaigns create different pressures on the regime than those exerted by a civil war. A too strong reaction may backfire on the regime or induce a violent response, as recently happened in Syria and Libya. On the other hand, civil disobedience campaigns place a considerable existential pressure

on the regime, which at times may be as serious as that of a violent civil conflict. Most importantly, as Chenoweth and Stephan argue, civil disobedience campaigns are more likely to produce divisions and loyalty shifts within the regime, including the officers and troops of the security apparatus.[29] This fact especially makes the military a subject worthy of specific analysis, because its tendency to perpetrate violence against protesters may be influenced by the commonalities it shares with the civilian sphere.

Based on this assumption, I attempted to identify several factors that create an overlap between the military sphere and the civilian sphere. Perhaps the one that most easily comes to mind is mandatory conscription. Conscripted militaries are composed of civilians who were drafted, usually for a predetermined period of time, rather than those who volunteered to pursue a professional career as soldiers. This distinction is important because professional soldiers may be less likely to be affected by loyalty shifts that influence the general population. In addition, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), who compose the backbone of many modern militaries, are usually draftees who decided to become professionals.

Another important facet of conscription relates to the officers corps. In most militaries, officers are selected through a system of examinations and undergo specific academic education that prepares them for their future role. Amos Perlmutter commented on this point, stating that, "Praetorian conditions are connected with professional military establishments and structures, some of which are institutionalized ahead of concomitant political and socioeconomic structures."[30] Many military organizations, however, also allow officer promotion through the ranks. In some cases (for example, Israel and Greece), the only way to become an officer is by being trained as a soldier and an NCO first. These different policies produce different types of officer corps, some of which may have more in common with the civilian sphere and hence will be more attuned to its demands (e.g., the IDF officer objection letters).

The perspective on conscription suggests the following hypothesis:

> *H3:* The probability of military violence during a civil disobedience campaign will be greater when the military and officer corps are voluntary and professionalized, and less likely to share the perspective of the civilian protesters.

Another area where the military and the civilian spheres overlap is that of discrimination in recruitment and promotion against certain groups. I theorize that if a military organization favors recruiting or recruits only from certain groups, it will be more likely to use violence against protesters from other marginalized or excluded groups. This may be especially true during self-determination campaigns. Military discrimination may be based on religion, political affiliation, class, or ethnic origin. It may also vary in degree, from slight discrimination in recruitment, through keeping certain units or the officer corps closed to the members of certain groups, to complete exclusion from military service. Naturally, the lesser a protesting group's representation in a military organization is, the smaller the perspective the latter shares with group. Hence, I derived the following hypothesis:

> *H4:* The probability of military violence during a civil disobedience campaign will be greater when recruitment practices in the military organization discriminate against the protesting group.

Controls and Measurement of Variables

In addition to the four hypotheses described above, I also examined three additional hypotheses to account for relevant control variables. First, because both my measurements of violent crackdown and mass killing are based on numeric values, civil disobedience campaigns in countries with larger population may be at a higher risk for violence. This could happen because larger countries experience larger protests, which either require more violence to repress or involve more casualties even if less violence were perpetrated. Hence, a state's population constitutes an important control variable in my model:

> *H5:* The probability of military violence during civil disobedience campaigns will increase when the population from which the protesters are drawn is larger.

Second, although I focus specifically on militarized regimes, violence against civilians could be explained by the fact that the regime is nondemocratic. Militarized regimes constitute a subgroup of nondemocratic regimes, and as such may not be unique in perpetrating violence. One condition that should be considered, however, is the fact that my database contains mostly nondemocratic regimes. This is because democracies are less likely to experience campaigns with a maximalist aim as described above. Moreover, none of the countries described as democracies in my studies perpetrated mass killing. As a result, I decided to also examine the level of autocracy of a regime:

> *H6:* Military organizations in nondemocratic/more autocratic regimes are more likely to perpetrate violence and mass killing against protesters.

Last, the probability of regime violence may be affected by economic conditions. For example, well-paid soldiers will be less likely to prey on the civilian population, while wealthier militaries will be more likely to be supported in the field:

> *H7:* States with higher GDP will be less likely to experience military violence against civilians.

Some of the variables used in this analysis, for example GDP or mass killing, were drawn from other quantitative databases. However, the military centric variables were coded specifically for this study. These variables include violent crackdown, discrimination in the military, conscription, paramilitary activity, and military politicization. In coding these variables, I relied on numerous secondary historical sources, journalistic accounts, and specific state-related publications.[31] The majority of variables were coded in binary (AKA "dummies"), apart from one case (degree of military politicization), which I coded based on degree and extent.

Violent Crackdown

This variable (VIOLENT CRACKDOWN) was defined above and coded in binary form. A value of 1 was assigned to all cases in which regime violence occurred and a value of 0 if not (see Appendix for a listing of violent crackdown cases).

Mass Killing

This variable (MASS KILLING) was defined above and coded in binary form. A value of 1 was assigned to all cases in which mass killing occurred and a value of 0 if not (see Appendix for a listing of mass killing cases).

Discrimination

Discrimination is defined as any partial policy implemented by the military to limit the representation of the protesting group in the organization anytime during the campaign. This policy may or may not reflect the situation in the political leadership or the state of mind in the country. In balanced militaries, military recruitment policy should roughly represent the ethnic diversity within the country. A good example would be the Kenyan military, which, at least officially, followed a policy of recruiting groups based on their representation in the general population. In countries where discrimination in the military exists, the ethnic diversity in the military does not resemble, in proximity, that of society at large. The existence of any discrimination (DISCRIMINATION EXISTS) was coded in binary. A value of 1 was assigned to militaries that showed any type of discrimination in recruitment and promotion, regardless of type or degree. A value of 0 was assigned if not. In addition, I coded four different types of discrimination: ethnic, political, religious, and economic (or class).

I used the following standards for coding each type of discrimination:

0–Assigned to cases where no discrimination existed.

1–Assigned to cases where certain groups were limited/discouraged from joining, but could volunteer and serve in all levels; or where a foreign military force that *did* recruit members of the protesting group was deployed (e.g., the Red Army in the Baltic States in 1989); or where the whole military recruited exclusively from a single group; or where the officer corps and certain units were exclusive AND certain groups were limited from joining and abused when they did join; or where a foreign military force that *did not* recruit members of the protesting group was deployed to contain protest; or where the paramilitary force of a certain faction became the state's military de facto; or where certain groups were allowed to join, but remained marginalized in certain units (combat, officer corps, special forces) or in the military as a whole. "Marginalized" was defined as a 20% or more difference between the protesting group's percent of the population in comparison to its representation in the military. Due to the lack of availability of statistical data in several cases, however, I was forced many times to use qualitative analysis.

Conscription

Conscription is defined as the existence of any degree of compulsory service levies for the military organization of a state, which exists de-facto and not only as a provision in the state's constitution. The existence of conscription (CONSCRIPTION) was coded in binary. A value of 1 was assigned to a military that used any degree of conscription. A value of 0 was assigned if not. I used the following standards for coding:

0–Assigned to cases where military service is completely voluntary.

1–Assigned to cases where conscription existed, but was limited in number, percentage, class, or region (including factional/tribal forces); or where "lucky dips" or lottery draft existed; or where there was mandatory conscription for the regular army, but becoming an officer or joining an elite unit required volunteering for a longer period of time or necessitated a different path than that of conscription, such as military academies; or where conscription existed for all units of the military, including elite forces and the officer corps.

Paramilitary Activity

This variable (PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY) codes different types of paramilitary organizations, according to the degree of control exercised over these organizations by the civilian government and the regular military. A paramilitary is defined as an armed organization other than the army or the local police (such as a gendarmerie, government militias, armed youth movements, etc.), the total size of which is bigger than a battalion (500 men), and which was sanctioned the right to use violence. Since states hold monopoly on using violence, paramilitaries can be conceived as contractors of violence with different levels of independence from the military chain of command.

Paramilitary organizations vary extensively in terms of type, ideology, origin, size, armament, and objectives. This fact made coding paramilitaries on a linear scale according to one of these categories unlikely to provide a complete picture of their relationship with violence against civilians. Instead, I attempted to code these organizations based on how ingrained they were in the military sphere and how much freedom was given to them within the civilian sphere. I argue that in states where the political chain of command and civil-military relations are well defined and standardized, paramilitary organizations are more likely to behave similarly to the regular military. For example, the U.S. National Guard is almost identical to the U.S. Army in terms of training and structural organization, and operates under very similar civilian and military constraints. In this case, the difference between not having a paramilitary organization (U.S. Army alone) and having a paramilitary organization (U.S. Army and National Guard) does not fundamentally change the nature of the military apparatus. Neither does it significantly change the nature of its manpower, because the National Guard does not favor "evil" individuals over other volunteers. This type of paramilitary organizations I call "regulated paramilitaries."

In states where these conditions (i.e., the primacy of the civilian chain of command or well defined civil-military relations) do not hold, a paramilitary organization may be more likely to engage in some activities that the regular military is unlikely to pursue. This type of paramilitary organization is also less likely to receive appropriate (or even minimal) training. When compared with this type of paramilitary organization, the U.S. National Guard strikes much less resemblance than, say, its predecessor, the state militias. The difference between a group that is accountable only to its tribe, to a single leader (such as the *Janjaweed* in Sudan), or to no one in particular (such as the Serb Arkan Tigers) and a well regulated paramilitary is much more acute than, say, the difference between the National Guard and the U.S. Army.[32] I call these types of organizations "unregulated paramilitaries."

Based on these differences, I used the following standards to code paramilitary organizations:

0–Assigned to cases where a paramilitary organization did not exist or was well regulated. Regulated paramilitaries are organizations that answer directly to the military or the government in the form of a general, etc. (for example, a gendarmerie).

1–Assigned to cases where the paramilitary organization was not subjugated to the military chain of command and where other forms of political regulation barely existed. This category includes cases where the paramilitary organization was an independent contractor of the government; or where this organization was given jurisdiction beyond that of an internal intelligence gathering agency (the ability to assassinate on the spot, for example); or where factional or tribal paramilitary organizations that were sanctioned by the state existed; or where the paramilitary organization's command bypassed the government, answered directly to the leader, and was used for aggressive rather than defensive purposes.

Military Politicization

Military politicization is defined as any involvement of active duty military personnel (i.e., not retired) in the civilian sphere. This variable (MILITARY POLITICIZATION) codes the degree to which the civilian government is militarized. The reader should be aware that in other sources military politicization is sometimes used to describe political indoctrination of military personnel, a different phenomenon than the one coded here. I used the following standards for coding:

0–Assigned to cases where the military did not hold any political positions directly, and was completely subordinate to civilian state institutions.

1 –Assigned to cases where some active duty members of the military held political positions (e.g., there was no minister of defense) or formed the strongest national elite, but remained under civilian primacy.

2 –Assigned to cases where the military controlled the government, but where some civilian participation existed in ministerial form.

3 –Assigned to cases where exclusive military junta held every senior political position.

Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization

This variable (ETHNOLINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION) was coded based on the index composed by Phillip G. Roeder. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization index uses a formula developed by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson in 1972, which calculates the probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to a different group. Roeder's data were derived from Soviet sources, as well as the *Europa World Yearbook*. One of Roeder's improvements on other indices is that it provides a more detailed analysis of ethnic groups:

[This index] uses none of the groupings reported in the sources when data on sub-groups are available. (For example, it treats separate Native American groups as separate ethnic groups rather than combining these in a catch-all "Indigenous Peoples." Similarly, it treats Hutus and Tutsis as separate ethnic groups rather than grouping these as Banyarwanda in Rwanda or Barundi in Burundi.) In addition, in settler societies of the Western Hemisphere, this index treats racial distinctions within ethnolinguistic groups (Afro-Americans versus White Americans or Afro-Colombians versus Euro-Colombians) as separate ethnic groups.[33]

Another advantage is the fact that Roeder's ethnolinguistic data is updated for any country that existed in 2001, after the wave of new state creation in Asia and Europe during the 1990s. I used Roeder's index to examine the relationship between ethnic diversity in a given country and military centric factors.[34]

Regime Type

For coding regime type, I used the Polity IV data.[35] To highlight the distinction between democracies and everyone else, I used a binary variable (DEMOCRACY). A regime with combined Polity score of +6 or higher was assigned a value of 1, if not 0. However, because my database contains only a few democracies and because none of the regimes I coded as democracies perpetrated mass killing, I also used the standard Polity coding (POLITY). For campaigns that lasted several years, I used the average Polity score for the duration of the campaign.

Population Size

Ideally, I would have tested hypothesis *H5* using the number of protesters as a percent of the entire population. In most cases, however, establishing the total number of protesters as defined above was impossible using existing sources. Even in campaigns with a secessionist or self-determinist agenda, the protest would have been unlikely to include all members of the campaigning groups. Instead, I coded the size of the total population of the state in which the campaign took place at the beginning of the campaign (POPULATION).[36]

State GDP

This variable was coded as the average gross GDP of the state in which the campaign took place for the duration of the campaign (GDP).[37]

Results and Empirical Findings

I carried three stages of logistic regressions to test my hypotheses for all civil disobedience campaigns between 1972 and 2012. In the first stage, I examined the relationship between military centric and state centric variables, and violent crack-down. In the second stage, I examined the relationship between military centric and control variables, and mass killing. In the third stage, I examined the effects of specific types of discrimination in the military on mass killings. Because I examined a relatively small group of cases (97 observations), I reported every relationship that had a significance level smaller than 0.1. When the relationship had a significance level

Table 1. Logarithmic regression analysis of probability of violent crackdown in civil disobedience campaigns, 1972–2012 (stage 1)

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Z Score	Significance level
Military politicization	0.061	0.25	.802
Conscription	0.204	0.39	.694
Paramilitary activity	0.980	1.78	.075
Discrimination exists	0.148	0.21	.831
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	−0.254	−0.27	.787
GDP	−0.001	−0.83	.407
Population size	0.000	1.97	.049
Democracy (binary)	−2.114	−1.9	.057
Constant	−1.106	−1.5	.134

Note: Number of observations: 97; log likelihood $= -53.853$; Wald $\text{Chi}^2 = 11.12$. All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.

equal to or smaller than that of the statistical convention for two-tailed tests ($p = .025$), I reported it as being "highly significant."

The findings of my analyses are presented in Tables 1–4. The coefficient, Z Score, and significance level are reported for each variable. The results support my underlying premise that military centric factors produce an effect on the organization's likelihood to perpetrate violence against civilians. Most notably, discrimination within the military against the protesting group seems to have a highly significant and very strong effect on the likelihood of mass killing. This finding confirms *H4*. *H1*, which assumes a relationship between paramilitary organizations and violence against civilians, and *H2*, which assumes a relationship between a higher degree of military politicization and military violence, were also supported by the data. Paramilitary activity had a significant relationship with violent crackdowns, and both military politicization and paramilitary activity showed a highly significant relationship with mass killing in both stages of the mass killing analysis. In addition, autocratic regimes had a significant

Table 2. Logarithmic regression analysis of probability of mass killing in civil disobedience campaigns, 1972–2012 (stage 2)

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Z Score	Significance level
Military politicization	0.866	2.35	.019
Conscription	−0.722	−0.96	.337
Paramilitary activity	1.833	2.3	.021
Discrimination exists	3.44	3.05	.002
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	−0.407	−0.29	.772
GDP	−0.008	−1.68	.094
Population size	5.86E-06	2.56	.011
Democracy (polity)	−0.178	−1.72	.086
Constant	−4.271	−3.03	.002

Note: Number of observations: 97; log likelihood $= -27.857$; Wald $\text{Chi}^2 = 14.26$. All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.

Table 3. Logarithmic regression analysis of probability of mass killing in civil disobedience campaigns when ethnic discrimination exists in the military, 1972–2012 (stage 3)

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Z Score	Significance level
Military politicization	0.813	2.01	.044
Conscription	0.084	0.10	.921
Paramilitary activity	1.973	2.38	.017
Ethnic discrimination	9.919	2.86	.004
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	−0.902	−0.63	.529
GDP	−0.013	−1.79	.074
Population size	0.000007	2.26	.024
Democracy (polity)	−0.448	−2.44	.015
Constant	−5.922	−3.12	.002

Note: Number of observations: 97; log likelihood = –23.776; Wald Chi^2 = 12.26. All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.

relationship with violence against civilians in all stages of analysis. This supports the assumption that militaries in autocratic regimes are more likely to perpetrate violence against civilians, which confirms *H6*. The size of the population proved to have a significant relationship with both types of military violence in all stages of the analysis, but this relationship was very weak. Last, a nation's GDP was significant during at least some stages of analysis, but its effects were also weak.[38]

The results of the first stage of my analysis are presented in Table 1. *H1* is the only military centric hypothesis confirmed by the result. The level of paramilitary activity proved to have a significant relationship with violent crackdowns, although not a very strong one. Of the state centric hypotheses, *H6* was supported by the results, with violent crackdown being more likely in nondemocratic regimes. The size of the population was also significant, lending some support to *H5*. The marginal effects of this model's variables are presented in Table 5.

Table 4. Logarithmic regression analysis of probability of mass killing in civil disobedience campaigns when economic discrimination exists in the military, 1972–2012 (stage 3)

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Z Score	Significance level
Military politicization	0.492	1.60	.111
Conscription	−0.644	−0.97	.334
Paramilitary activity	1.440	2.17	.030
Economic discrimination	1.343	0.65	.513
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	0.559	0.46	.644
GDP	−0.004	–1.11	.266
Population size	0.000004	−2.08	.037
Democracy (polity)	−0.151	−1.61	.107
Constant	−3.388	−2.60	.009

Note: Number of observations: 97; log likelihood = −33.688; Wald Chi^2 = 11.21. All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.

Table 5. Marginal impact of variables on the probability of violent crackdown in civil disobedience campaigns

Explanatory variable	Relative risk ratio	Percent change for risk group	Absolute change in variable	Confidence interval (for absolute change in probability)
Paramilitary activity (change from 0 to 1)	1.450	48% to 70%	0.217	0.182–0.253
Population (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	1.533	27% to 41%	0.144	0.119–0.168
Democracy (change from 0 to 1 percentile)	0.292	48% to 14%	−0.340	−0.374–(−0.306)

Note: Violent crackdown ratio for sample group was 0.391 for $N = 97$ observations. Some values may appear inconsistent with preceding values because of rounding.

Table 2 presents the results of the second stage of my analysis. *H1, H2,* and *H4* are strongly supported by the data. Military politicization, paramilitary activity, and the existence of discrimination were highly significant. State GDP and Polity grade also had a significant relationship with mass killing, which lends some support to *H6* and *H7*. In addition, the size of the population had a highly significant effect on the likelihood of mass killing. Generally, however, the relationship between state centric factors and mass killing was less strong than that of military centric factors, as presented by the marginal effect of these variables in Table 6.

Table 3 presents the first part of the third stage of my analysis, which examined the effect of specific types of discrimination in military recruitment and promotion on the likelihood of mass killing.[39] The significant variables from the previous model generally maintained the same level of significance and strength. The relationship between Polity and mass killing became a bit stronger than in the previous stage. The main finding of this model, however, is the highly significant and very strong relationship between the existence of ethnic discrimination in the military and mass killing. Discrimination in recruitment on ethnic grounds increases the group under risk for mass killing from 2% of the cases to 94% (see Table 7). This finding lends additional support to *H2*. The fact that the ethnolinguistic fragmentation is significantly correlated with neither of the models examining mass killing provides a higher degree of confidence that it's not social ethnic cleavages that make violence on ethnic or national grounds more likely.[40] The marginal effects of this model's variables are presented in Table 7.

Table 4 presents the second part of the third stage of my analysis. Again, most variables from the second stage maintained the same level of significance and strength, excluding the Polity score and military politicization. However, economic discrimination appears to bear no significant effect on the likelihood of mass killing.

The marginal effect of all significant variables on the probability of violent crackdown and mass killing during civil obedience campaigns is described in Tables 5–7. I also reported the risk ratio for each variable. Risk ratio describes the effect of increasing one unit (for binary variables) or from the 25th to the 75th percentile (for continuous variables) on violent crackdowns or mass killings, if all other variables

Table 6. Marginal impact of variables on the probability of mass killing in civil disobedience campaigns (for unspecified discrimination), 1972–2012

Explanatory variable	Relative risk ratio	Percent change for risk group	Absolute change in variable	Confidence interval (for absolute change in probability)
Military politicization (change from 0 to 3)	8.06	1% to 10%	0.084	0.07–0.098
Paramilitary activity (change from 0 to 1)	4.865	2% to 11%	0.084	0.068–0.101
Discrimination exists (change from 0 to 1)	16.305	2% to 36%	0.333	0.298–0.368
Politicization, paramilitary, and discrimination (all change from 0 to 1)	76.791	1% to 90%	0.890	0.866–0.914
GDP (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	0.493	4% to 2%	−0.021	−0.064–0.021
Population (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	1.210	∼ 0%	0.003	−0.002–0.009
Polity (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	0.384	4% to 1%	−0.024	−0.031–(−0.016)

Note: Mass killing ratio for sample group was 0.165 for $N = 97$ observations. Some values may appear inconsistent with preceding values because of rounding.

are held in their mode (for binary variables) or mean (for continuous variables). In order to show the impact of each variable, I also included the change (in percent) for the risk group after the increase of one unit, or from the 25th to the 75th percentile. The change in each variable is examined while all other variables are held in constant values, which represent an average "baseline" observation.[41] Figure 1 presents the change in risk ratio as the value of the variables increase from 0 to 1, or from the 25th to the 75th percentile, as described in Table 5–7.

Table 5 reports the predicted change in the probability of violent crackdowns for each of the significant variables from Table 1 as they increase in value. The existence of paramilitary activity, the only significant military centric variable in the first stage of the analysis, made violent crackdowns for an average observation 1.5 times more likely. Of the state centric variables, democracies were 29% as likely as nondemocratic regimes to crack down on protesters. Last, countries with large populations were 1.5 times as likely to crack down on protesters as countries with small populations. However, because a country in the upper quartile of population size was almost 10 times larger than a country in the lower quartile (48,508,000 and 5,080,000, respectively), this finding suggests that in reality the population size has no serious effect on the likelihood of violent crackdown as defined above (50 casualties or more).

Table 6 reports the predicted change in probability of mass killing for each of the significant variables from Table 2 as they increase in value. All three military centric variables produced a strong effect on the likelihood of mass killing in this model. Extremely

Table 7. Marginal impact of variables on the probability of mass killing in civil disobedience campaigns (for ethnic discrimination), 1972–2012

Explanatory variable	Relative risk ratio	Percent change for risk group	Absolute change in variable	Confidence interval (for absolute change in probability)
Military politicization (change from 0 to 3)	5.302	~1% to 6%	0.045	0.031–0.060
Paramilitary activity (change from 0 to 1)	4.563	2% to 7%	0.0578	0.040–0.075
Ethnic discrimination (change from 0 to 1)	57.763	2% to 94%	0.921	0.891–0.950
Politicization, paramilitary, and discrimination (all change from 0 to 1)	117.020	1% to 99%	0.983	0.964–0.991
GDP (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	0.338	5% to 2%	−0.030	−0.041–(−0.014)
Population (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	1.191	~ 0%	0.002	−0.006–0.011
Polity (change from 25th to 75th percentile)	0.152	5% to 1%	−0.045	−0.0057–(−0.033)

Note: Mass killing ratio for sample group is 0.165 for $N=97$ observations. Some values may appear inconsistent with preceding values because of rounding.

militarized regimes (military juntas) were more than 8 times more likely to perpetrate mass killing than non-militarized regimes, increasing the total likelihood from 1% to 10%. The existence of unregulated paramilitary organizations made mass killing nearly 5 times more likely, with a total increase of 10% in the group under risk. Recruitment discrimination within the military had the strongest effect on the likelihood of mass killing during civil disobedience campaigns. The existence of any type of discrimination made mass killing more than 16 times more likely, a total increase of 34% in the group under risk. In high-risk militaries, i.e. military organizations in which all military centric variables were fixed at their maximal value, mass killing during civil disobedience campaigns was 77 times more likely, a total increase of 89% in the group under risk.

State centric variables also produced an effect on the likelihood of mass killing, although this effect was weaker than that of the military centric ones. States with higher GDP were nearly half as likely to perpetrate mass killing as states with lower GDP, a total decrease of 2% in the group under risk. Countries with larger population were only 20% more likely to perpetrate mass killing than countries with smaller population, a total change of less than 1% in the group under risk. Last, less autocratic regimes were 38% less likely to perpetrate mass killing during a civil disobedience campaign, a total change of 3% in the group under risk.

Table 7 presents the impact of the same variables on the probability of mass killing if the discrimination within the military is specifically ethnic. Once again, the effect

Figure 1. Changes in the risk of moderate crackdown and mass killing during civil obedience campaigns (mass killing models for unspecified and ethnic discrimination) (color figure available online). *Note*: changes in the risk are calculated based on the probability changes reported in Tables 5–7.

of military centric factors is noticeable in this model. The effect of military politicized regimes was reduced, but military juntas were still more than 5 times more likely to perpetrate mass killing. Regimes with unregulated paramilitary activity maintained the same likelihood of mass killing (4.5 times the risk ratio). Once again, discrimination within the military produced the highest impact on the likelihood of mass killing. Militaries that discriminated against the protesting group on ethnic grounds were 57 times more likely to perpetrate mass killing, a total increase of 92% in the group under risk. When all three factors were fixed at their maximum value, high-risk militaries were 117 times more likely to perpetrate mass killing, a total increase of 98% in the group under risk.

Turning to the state centric variables, states with higher GDP were 3 times less likely to experience mass killing during civil disobedience campaigns, a total change of 3% in the group under risk. States with large populations were 20% more likely to experience mass killing, but this effect produced no noticeable change in the group under risk. Last, more autocratic regimes were almost 7 times more likely to perpetrate mass killing during civil disobedience campaigns than less autocratic regimes, a change of 4% in the group under risk. All changes in risk ratio for Tables 5–7 are shown in Figure 1.

Conclusion

I have argued that the military plays an independent or semi-independent role in perpetrating violence against protesters during civil disobedience campaigns. Hypotheses derived from extant literature on internal conflict neglect to focus on the role of the state's military and paramilitary organizations as the prime perpetrators of violence in cases where the regime faces an existential threat. I found that military centric meters could explain some of the incidences of violence against civilians. Paramilitary activity proved to have a significant effect on the occurrence of both violent crackdowns and mass killings. Democracies were less likely to crack down on civilians, and so were countries with small populations. However, because of the difference in orders of magnitude between countries with large populations and countries with small populations, this effect is probably negligible.

When I examined the probability of mass killing, however, military centric factors proved to have a strong effect. I found that high-risk militaries made mass killing during a civil disobedience campaign much more likely, especially when the military organization discriminated against the protesting group on ethnic grounds. State centric factors (namely state GDP, population, and Polity score) also produced some effect on the probability of mass killing, but this effect was weak in comparison to that of the military centric factors. Interestingly, the existence of conscription (or lack thereof) did not produce any effect on violence in any of my models. This suggests that the focus on military professionalization in current nation-building literature may be somewhat exaggerated.[42]

These findings should not be considered as conclusive evidence nullifying the explanation for violence against civilians provided by the state centric approach, but rather as an attempt to complement them. First, I used numerical standards for measuring both violent crackdown and mass killing, which may differ from the standards used by some state centric scholars. Second, in my analysis I focused on military centric theories and used very general controls for state centric factors. A more detailed analysis of state centric factors has recognized different variables that influence violence against civilians, and undoubtedly there is more to be revealed in this area. Nevertheless, as I noted numerous times in this paper, my purpose was to examine the effect of military centric factors on violence against civilians and not the specific reasons for this violence. My analysis does support hypotheses derived from the military centric literature.

Why, then, does the state security apparatus produce this effect? In the beginning of this article, I suggested four possible causes: lack of ability (or will) to control the forces in the field, lack of logistical support, viewing the campaigning group as a foreign element, and using paramilitaries. My analysis lends support to two of these causes. The impact of the first two, however, should not be neglected. Case studies of mass killings during civil war would suggest that the lack of support pushes troops to exploit the local population for food or resources.[43] The lack of political control can also beget a phenomenon of "warlordism," where local military commanders exercise control over the local population and benefit from criminal activities. This may be especially true when discussing paramilitary organizations.[44] Developing and testing theories that can help understand the behavior of the military under the first two constraints represents one important area for future research.

Another direction of research would be to examine the effect military centric factors produce on violence against civilians during civil wars. As I mentioned earlier, this type of conflict provides the military with a different set of incentives for targeting civilians. During civil wars, military organizations may also be more likely to operate under the constraints I mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, during violent conflicts substate actors and rebel groups regularly perpetrate violence against civilians, a rare occurrence during nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns. In short, a military centric approach to civil war studies represents another important area for future research.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. The dataset and accompanying codebook may be accessed at http://www.polisci.umn.edu/people/gradprofile.php?UID=koren044.

2. For more about the lack of attention given to civil-military relations in the political sciences, see Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211–241 (especially 212–213 and 230–232).

3. As part of my research, I examined the occurrence of large-scale military defection, but found no significant relationship with any of my independent and control variables.

4. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Online Appendix Accompanying "Why Civil Resistance Works,"* paper accompanying the "Why Civil Resistance Works" Database 1898–2006, http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/research-and-data/.

5. Ibid.

6. When running a controlled logit model for length, I found a significant relationship between the level of military politicization and the length of a campaign ($p = .016$). This means that longer campaigns took place in countries where the government was militarized.

7. Ibid.

8. Although there were few borderline cases (where the number of casualties was roughly 50 deaths), in most cases the number of casualties was either much higher than 50 deaths or much lower.

9. For a partial list of examples of nonviolent resistance, see Gene Sharpe, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973), 117–433.

10. Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, *Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing,* report written for the Political Instability Task Force, February 2008.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. See, for example: Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47; Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Benjamin Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Andreas Wimmer, *National Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

14. Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, *From Protest to Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination Movements* (manuscript) (New Haven, CT: Yale University, January 4, 2005), 3.

15. See, for example: Andrew J. Dowdle, "Civil Wars, International Conflicts and Other Determinants of Paramilitary Strength in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 2 (2007): 161–174; John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 42–70; and Ariel I. Ahram, "Origins and Persistence of State-Sponsored Militias: Path Dependent Processes in Third World Military Development," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 4 (2011): 531–556.

16. See: Ariel I. Ahram, *Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Sabine Carey, Niel J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, "A New Database on Pro-Government Armed Groups" (paper presented at the 50th ISA Convention, New York, Feb. 15–18, 2009), 1; Dowdle, "Civil Wars, International Conflicts and Other Determinants of Paramilitary Strength in Sub-Saharan Africa" (see note 15 above), 74; David Kowalewski, "Counterinsurgent Paramilitarism: A Philippine Case Study," *The Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 71 (1992): 71–84.

17. Dowdle, "Civil Wars, International Conflicts and Other Determinants of Paramilitary Strength in Sub-Saharan Africa" (see note 15 above), 164.

18. See: Ahram, "Origins and Persistence of State-Sponsored Militias" (see note 15 above), 531–556; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (see note 13 above), 55–58; 89–103; Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War" (see note 15 above): 42–70; Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" (see note 13 above), 27–47.

19. One exception is a database about pro-government militias between the years 1981 and 2007: Sabine Carey, Niel J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, "State, The Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-government Militias," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 2 (2013): 249–258.

20. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 9. For more information about Chenoweth and Stephan's findings see: Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). I focused on Chenoweth and Stephan's database rather than their findings, and therefore chose not to cite their book in this study.

21. See, for example: Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957); T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "Political Economy of Death Squads: Towards a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror," *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (1989): 175–198; Claude E. Welsh Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases for Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

22. See: Mason and Krane, "Political Economy of Death Squads" (note 21 above), 178; Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, eds. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3–11; Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit, *The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy* (London: Zed Books, 2002); Claude E. Welsh Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases for Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

23. See, for example: S. E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd enlarged, rev. and updated ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 20–27; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987); Martin C. Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power," *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (1975): 63–79; Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army," *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969): 382–404; David C. Rapoport, "The Political Dimensions of Military Usurpation," *Political Science Quarterly* 83, no. 4 (1968): 551–572.

24. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (see note 21 above), 87.

25. Chenoweth and Stephan, *Online Appendix Accompanying "Why Civil Resistance Works"* (see note 4 above).

26. Stephan and Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works" (see note 20 above), 9.

27. Ibid., 16.

28. Chenoweth and Stephan, *Online Appendix Accompanying "Why Civil Resistance Works"* (see note 4 above), 8.

29. Stephan and Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works" (see note 20 above), 11–12.

30. Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army" (see note 23 above), 384.

31. The list of sources used is too extensive to cite here. Among the most important sources were the country study guides published by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress and the American University, the LexisNexis Academic search engine, and the historical dictionary series of Scarecrow Publishing.

32. This conclusion was supported by analysis of different levels of paramilitary activity. The strongest relationship was achieved by examining not the levels of paramilitary activity or the existence of these organizations, but by dividing paramilitaries along the level of regulation.

33. Phillip G. Roeder, *Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985*, last modified on September 18, 2001, http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm.

34. There are other, more detailed indices I could have used, for example: James D. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 195–222; and Lars-Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer, *Ethnic Power Relations Dataset*, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796 UNF:5:k4xxXC2ASI204QZ4jqvUrQ=V1. However, I preferred to use the ELF index because it presents in the most direct way the level of fractionalization in a given country, which could be easily measured against my military centric variables. Like other ELF composers, Roeder relied mostly on Soviet data collected during the 1980s. This, however, is not as big an issue as it may appear to be, because the ethnic composition of the countries measured is not expected to have changed much since these data were collected, and because Roeder has adapted the data to all the countries that existed in 2001.

35. Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, *Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristic and Transition Database*, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. I also considered other democratization indexes, which were used by the composers of the polity index, such as Tatu Vanhanen's index (www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/), and the Freedom House Freedom in the World index (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world).

36. Population data was obtained through: U.S. Census Bureau, *International Demographic Data Base*, http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php.

37. Note: in some of my preliminary models, I used the logarithmic value of both population size and state GDP. However, because using log values showed no significant change in the results, I decided not to report these findings and use the regular values of both variables instead. GDP data and forecasts obtained through: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, *International Macroeconomic Data Set, 1969–2020*, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/#HistoricalMacroTables.

38. This could be partially explained by the fact that the effect of population is calculated for a single person and the effect of GDP is calculated for 1$. Both hence show very small coefficients.

39. As the reader may recall, I coded four different types of discrimination (ethnic, political, religious, and economic/class). When running my model for particular discriminations, however, discrimination on political and religious grounds were omitted because their coefficient was 0.

40. This argument is supported by other studies on civil war that suggest that ethnicity is not, in itself, a reason for violence. See, for example: James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn, "From Protest to Violence" (see note 14 above); Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerilla Warfare," *International Organizations* 58, no. 1 (2004): 393–399.

41. The average baseline scenario in this sample group was set as follows: military politicization was fixed at its mean (1.103), the existence of conscription was fixed at its median (1), paramilitary activity was fixed at its median (0), the existence of any discrimination was fixed at its median (0), ethnolinguistic fractionalization was fixed at its mean (0.474), population size was fixed at its mean (66,567.4), GDP was fixed at its mean (107.254), and democracy score was fixed at its median (0). When examining mass killings, democracy score was exchanged for Polity score, which was fixed at its mean (–3.258).

42. See, for example: Charles T. Call, ed., *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), specifically Barnett R. Rubin, "The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding," 25–47; James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation,

2007), 34–41; James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, F. Stephen Larrabee et al., *Europe's Role in Nation-Building* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008); Julia Raue and Patrick Sutter, eds., *Facets and Practices of State-Building* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); and Cynthia A. Watson, *Nation-Building and Stability Operations* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 24–45.

    43. For some particular case studies see: David Keen, *Conflict and Conclusion in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005); Martin W. James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974–1990* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992); Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

    44. See: Ariel I. Ahram, *Proxy Warriors* (note 16 above), 1–25.

Appendix

Table A1. Sample cases that presented violent crackdown or mass killing during civil disobedience campaigns (out of a total of 97 observations)

Country	Years	Maximalist aim	Violent crackdown	Mass killing
Thailand	1973	Regime change	Yes	No
China	1976–1979	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Argentina	1977–1981	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Iran	1977–1978	Regime change	Yes	Yes
South Korea	1979–1980	Regime change	Yes	No
El Salvador	1979–1981	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Poland	1981–1989	Regime change	Yes	No
Chile	1983–1989	Regime change	Yes	No
South Africa	1984–1994	Self determination/ Regime change	Yes	Yes
Haiti	1985	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Sudan	1985	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Panama	1987–1989	Regime change	Yes	No
China (Tibet)	1987–1989	Self determination/ Secession	Yes	No
Romania	1987–1989	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Myanmar	1988	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Indonesia (East Timor)	1988–1999	Secession	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	1989–1990	Secession	Yes	No
Bulgaria	1989	Regime change	Yes	No
China+	1989	Regime change	Yes	No
Kyrgyzstan	1989	Regime change	Yes	No
Mali	1989–1992	Regime change	Yes	No
Nepal	1989–1990	Regime change	Yes	No
Yugoslavia (Kosovo Albanians)	1989–1999	Secession	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	1989–1990	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Russia	1990–1991	Regime change	Yes	No
Nigeria (Ogoni campaign)	1990–1995	Self determination	Yes	Yes
Niger	1991–1992	Regime change	Yes	No

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued

Country	Years	Maximalist aim	Violent crackdown	Mass killing
Thailand	1992	Regime change	Yes	No
Malawi	1992–1994	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Nigeria	1993–1999	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	1997–1998	Regime change	Yes	No
Nepal	2006	Regime change	Yes	No
Cameroon	2008	Regime change	Yes	No
Madagascar	2009	Regime change	Yes	No
Iran	2009–2010	Regime change	Yes	Yes
Tunisia	2011	Regime change	Yes	No
Egypt	2011–2012	Regime change	Yes	No